ABSTRACT The cognitive dynamic system (CDS) is a structured physical model and research tool inspired by certain features of the human brain. One such feature is the predictive adaptation of the organism to the future environment. From an engineering perspective, this property of the brain is of profound practical importance, particularly when the system, in the pursuit of goals or performing tasks, confronts unexpected adverse events or obstacles, which in the aggregate are commonly referred to as risk. To avert risk efficiently, much of the information processed in the past by the CDS is available for processing new information in one of the system's components termed the perceptor. In the face of uncertainty, the perceptor will provide the processed information to the executive in order for the latter to avoid probable risk. To that effect, the executive will be fitted with Bayesian filtering mechanisms that will guide the CDS to its goal through timely risk-avoiding actions. Those mechanisms not only have unique engineering applications but also potential value for understanding the predictive-adaptation property of the brain, which modern neuroscience attributes to the prefrontal cortex.
I. INTRODUCTION
The present paper, which is our latest effort to bring engineers and neuroscientists together with theoretical and empirical models that apply to both their fields [1] , [2] , presents the first architectural, functional and computational model that we know of the mechanisms of risk control within a general framework such as that of the Cognitive Dynamic System (CDS). The CDS is a theoretical construct designed to explain and explore, with practical applications, the mechanisms of adaptation of a system or organism to its environment. It has two major components: the perceptor, on one side of the CDS, and the executive on the other, with the feedback channel linking the executive with the perceptor. The CDS model is based on what we know about the mechanisms that the nervous system uses to guide the organism in behavior. In particular, the model mimics the human perceptionaction cycle (PAC) and the role played in it by the prefrontal cortex, which can be called with impunity the CDS of the brain [1] , [2] . The originality of our model rests mainly on the application to the CDS and to risk control of a fundamental principle of the neurophysiology of the prefrontal cortex: predictive adaptation. Although that principle has been applied by us to previous theoretical studies, it has never heretofore been applied in such functional-architectural detail as it is here to systems engineering and physiology, especially with regard to a future-oriented function as risk control.
A probabilistic cognitive dynamic system such as the CDS must embody the architectural and functional features of the PAC to optimally adapt, from cycle to cycle, its actions to the physical world. From a neuroscience point of view, to lead the organism to a goal within the PAC, the prefrontal cortex of the brain uses several essential cognitive-control functions: planning, executive attention, working memory, decisionmaking and inhibitory control. All of them are functionally intertwined in the pursuit of a goal of interest. Since the goal is by definition in the future, those functions are futureoriented: prospective and ''pre-adaptive,'' where the prefix ''pre'' stands for ''predictive''. The pursuit of the goal, however, is subject to potential interference from many sources. Some interference may come from the organism itself; others may come from the environment in the form of unexpected events. Both kinds of interference put goal-directed behavior at risk. To avert that risk, the prefrontal cortex makes use of its prospective cognitive functions to keep the behavior on track within the PAC and to protect it from interference and risk. The anatomical substrate of those functions is widely distributed throughout the prefrontal cortex in the form of neuronal networks which, when functionally active, make use of excitatory as well as inhibitory mechanisms. Excitation serves networks for selective-focusing in attention, perception, memory and action; inhibition serves the networks for the suppression of interference by irrelevance or error.
The purpose of this paper is to describe cognitive risk control in the CDS. Because risk control is a special function of the CDS, our discussion begins with a description of the principal functions of that system in cognitive control. The aim here is for cognitive control to simulate the human brain, which is the ultimate adaptive system in biology. Our view of adaptation of the CDS, as described heretofore, conforms well to a statistically stationary physical system. But, most importantly, how could the system, so defined, deal with risk control when it encounters unexpected uncertainties? To deal with this challenging problem, we need to expand the term ''adaptation'' to incorporate the concept of ''predictive adaptation'', which is increasingly recognized in the cognitive neuroscience literature.
Therefore, with the CDS designed to simulate the brain, we must intently look at the prefrontal cortex, the goal-directed action ''machine'' of the brain, especially when the issue is cognitive risk control. To this end, from an engineering perspective it is necessary to expand the cognitive controller in the executive of the CDS by introducing a sub-system. Under uncertainties, the sub-system is positioned at the bottom of the executive to address four key principles with cognitive risk control in mind: first, internal rewards are used for taskswitch control with two pairs of switches, one pair opened for perturbed cognitive action emerging from policy in the cognitive controller and the other pair for executive memory; second, the perturbed cognitive action for the left-hand side of a classifier and active executive memory on its righthand side are brought together; third, the classifier mediates between the perturbed cognitive action and set of prospective past experiences of the executive memory to produce risk-sensitive cognitive action on the physical system, for which the past experiences were collected in the absence of uncertainty; finally the prefrontal executive makes the CDS a predictive-adaptive system, mimicking the prefrontal cortex. Henceforth, we speak of the CDS, and the two terms, physical system and physical environment, interchangeably in what follows, depending on the point of interest. This paper is organized as follows: after this introductory Section I, outlining the basics of the CDS for cognitive risk control, Section II discusses the perception-action cycle within the CDS, which embodies the perceptor and the executive. Section III is devoted to the perceptor, whereas Section IV describes the shunt cycle. Section V describes the feedback channel and the internal rewards within it. Section VI deals with the executive that is free of uncertainty, whereas Section VII does it under uncertainty. Section VIII describes task-switch control followed by Section IX on predictive adaptation. Section X describes the functional architecture of the CDS. Section XI discusses the parallels of the physical CDS with the human brain. Finally, Section XII enumerates the conclusions from our study, as well as future works.
II. PERCEPTION-ACTION CYCLE
The PAC, first mentioned in the Introduction, is a fundamental principle of cognition [3] . Deeply rooted in biology, the PAC is the cybernetic information-processing loop that adapts the organism to its environment during aim-directed behavior or language. In the course of those activities, biological systems, and physical systems such as the CDS that we postulate, process incoming information through sensors and memory stores of previous sensory information (perceptors); the outcome of that processing informs the effectors or components of a motor system (executive) to execute a goaldirected action. That particular action produces change in the environment that is processed by sensors for further action, and so on until the goal of interest is reached.
There is much to be learned from the biology of PAC; one such item is a simplistic description of the CDS depicted in Fig. 1 . The figure summarizes schematically how indeed the PAC functions itself in the form of a global feedback loop. The PAC embodies the perceptor on the right and the executive on the left; they are linked together via feedback channel in the middle of the CDS, and finally the feedback loop is closed via the physical system at the bottom of the figure. Most importantly, underlying characteristics of the PAC are summarized as follows:
(i) The outcome of each cycle of the PAC is informative for subsequent cycles within the feedback loop. (ii) The PAC produces a directed flow of information from the perceptor to the executive in a continuous cyclic manner. (iii) In a goal-oriented scenario, for each action performed on the environment, the current PAC is guided by a hypothesis derived from memory, whereby the current cycle will either update or correct the hypothesis and thus inform the next cycle. The underlying characteristics of Fig. 1 , just described, apply to the regular PAC under the assumption that the physical system is free of uncertainty. However, in the presence of uncertainties, the PAC takes on a complexity of its own that is more elaborate than that of Fig. 1 . 
III. PERCEPTOR
Next, moving onto the perceptor in the CDS, it is made up of three functional items, as depicted in Fig. 2 . First, the Bayesian generative model of the observables originate from the physical system, positioned at the bottom of the figure; second, in the middle of the figure, the Bayesian filter is reciprocally coupled to the generative model; and third, the entropic state of the perceptor incorporates the output of the perceptor.
A. BAYESIAN GENERATIVE MODEL
To compute the Bayesian generative model of the perceptor, we look to the Bayesian paradigm [4] . Let the vector θ denote the observables that originate from the physical system and let the vector x denote the underlying state of the physical system. With generative modeling as the first processing stage with regards to the perceptor, we focus on the joint distribution denoted by p(θ, x). Hence, invoking the forward direction of the Bayes rule, we express the following equation:
which is derived from the following relationship: the conditional distribution, p (x | θ ), on the right-hand side of eq. (1) defines the distribution of x given θ , and p (θ ) defines the prior. As for p(x), it is the evidence that acts as a normalizing factor; for practical purposes it may be set aside. As for the conditional distribution on the left-hand side of the equation, p (θ | x), the observables are clearly dependent on the state of the physical system; it is therefore referred to as the generative posterior. It is instructive to express eq. (1) in a format using words as follows:
where the likelihood function, denoted by l (θ), stands for the conditional distribution, p (x | θ ). Accordingly, ignoring the evidence in the denominator, eq. (1) is simplified as follows:
The only parameter that needs to be accounted for is the prior, for which we offer the following assumption: under the generative model, the posterior is computed at the current iteration within the perceptor, where the posterior assumes the role of the prior in the next iteration, and so it goes on from one iteration within the perceptor to the next; note that for each PAC, there would be several iterations for each perceptual cycle within the CDS.
B. KALMAN FILTER: SPECIAL CASE OF THE BAYESIAN FILTER
The second component in the perceptor, namely filtering, requires a procedure for estimating the state of the physical system conditional on the generative posterior. In a generic sense, the Bayesian filter [5] is the optimal solution for the filter needed for the perceptor. However, the Bayesian filter is typically complex, except when the physical system is characterized by a linear state and a Gaussian distribution. The particular filter that satisfies these two conditions is the well-known Kalman filter [6] . From a computational viewpoint, the Kalman filter is more demanding than the Bayesian generative model, on two important points. First, whereas the generative model has direct access to the state of the physical system, the Kalman filter does not, and therefore we have to invoke the inverse (backward) direction of the Bayes rule. Second, we need to use the process of innovation to simplify the filtering computation of the generative posterior as the filter's input. This second point accounts for the fact that the innovation process replaces the sequence of filtering inputs with a corresponding sequence of linear operators, without any loss of information.
Furthermore, it is customary practice to use the wellknown state-space model for Kalman filtering, which consists of a pair of equations defined as follows:
1) SYSTEM EQUATION
In mathematical terms, this equation defines the updated state of the physical system expressed with respect to the current state, as follows:
where F k+1,k is a predictive square transition matrix from the state at k to k + 1, ω k denotes the state noise, and the symbol k denotes discrete time.
2) INTERNAL-MEASUREMENT EQUATION
The generative posterior, ϕ k , defines the internalmeasurement of the Kalman filter; hence, in mathematical terms, the internal measurement equation of the Kalman filter is expressed as follows:
where H k is a rectangular measurement matrix at time k, and ν k is noise in generative posterior.
Under these two equations, we bring into play a set of computational steps that proceed in an orderly manner, as described in [6] . The net result of the Kalman filtering algorithm is an output referred to as the filtering posterior of the physical system, which is optimally updated from one iteration to the next. Furthermore, in filtering there are two points of interest that should be noted:
(i) Updating of the posterior is the result of predictive processing applied to the generative posterior as input from one iteration to the next. (ii) For each iteration, the information flow of the filtering posterior contains a likelihood function of its own, l (x), that is defined to be p(x|θ ), and therefore the inverse direction of the Bayes rule is satisfied.
One other practical issue that needs to be addressed is the following: it could be that the state of the physical system is nonlinear but it remains to be Gaussian. There are several approximation-rooted procedures to overcome this limitation in the literature. Among them, the cubature Kalman filter (CKF) has much to offer [7] for the following reasons: in mathematical terms it is rigorous, and it has a lot of likable properties; hence, it is a good candidate for applications that require the use of nonlinear filtering under the Gaussian assumption.
The take-away from the discussion presented herein for filtering is the fact that in computational terms in so far as the perceptor is concerned, filtering is much more demanding than modeling when it comes to estimating the state of the physical system compared to modeling the observables. Simply put, for every gain made, there is a price to pay.
C. EXCITATION AND INHIBITION IN THE PERCEPTOR
Referring to the preceptor in Fig. 2 , we see the Bayesian generative model and the Bayesian filter, represented by the Kalman filter, are reciprocally coupled and form a local feedback loop. Following the second paragraph under the Introduction, there is an underlying mechanism that constitutes excitation and inhibition, for which the feedback loop is well-defined. To be specific, the excitation is represented by the bottom-up generative posterior and the inhibition is represented by the top-down attention. Hence, there are two different important results that emerge from these two representations:
(i) The Kalman filter picks up relevant information from the generative model.
(ii) In a corresponding way, irrelevant information is put aside by the generative model due to the Kalman filter. In a way, the generative model and the Kalman filter function together for the purposing of improving the relevant information of the Kalman filter, and reducing the irrelevant information of the generative model due to interference from one iteration to the next, both of which are performed within the perceptor. The lesson to be learned from this profound internal mechanism within the perceptor is attributed to the top-down attention [8] .
D. ENTROPIC INFORMATION-PROCESSOR
In Section II, we emphasized that the CDS is characterized by directed flow of information from the perceptor to the executive in a continuous cyclic manner. This information is called the entropic state of the perceptor that progresses from one PAC to the next; the basis of this distinctive behavior of the CDS builds on two related points:
(i) Perceptual posterior: it is to be viewed as the collective entity of the perceptor that embodies the generative model and the Kalman filter. (ii) Entropy: it is derived from Shannon's information theory [9] . Unlike this theory, however, the entropic state of the perceptor never assumes the value zero, simply because no matter how hard we try to improve the information processing behavior of the perceptor, there will always be imperfections within it in one form or another. With the perceptual posterior providing a probabilistic description of its own in the sense of information theory, we may now invoke Shannon's entropy [9] , [10] to make the following statement: 
It is noteworthy that under this equation, it is presumed that the environment is uncertainty-free; accordingly, the H k decreases in a continuous manner and with it the perceptor increases information gain about the environment from one PAC to the next.
IV. SHUNT CYCLE
The PAC has played a key role in the preceding three sections of the paper in one form or another, and it will continue on. There is another addition in the CDS that is the counterpart of the PAC, which is called the shunt cycle; for the sake of brevity, it will be referred to simply as the shunt. The two of them differ from each other, as follows: VOLUME 5, 2017 (i) The PAC is external in that it includes the entire CDS and the physical system; on the other hand, the shunt is an internal cyclic function that operates only within the CDS itself. (ii) The shunt operates in the opposite direction with respect to the PAC. (iii) Most importantly, the PAC and the shunt perform their respective functions separately without interfering with each other.
Over and above the links that are involved in the perceptor on the right and the executive on the left, the shunt also has two links of its own within the CDS under opposite information flows. First, the feedforward link of the shunt extends from the executive to the perceptor; second, the feedback link is in the opposite direction, from the perceptor back to the executive. In the context of attention, the underlying results of these two links are thus summarized as follows:
(i) On the perceptual side of the CDS, the shunt brings topdown attention-which was mentioned previouslyfrom the Kalman filter to the generative model, thereby resulting in a local feedback loop between the two of them. (ii) On the executive side, the shunt brings into play bottomup attention from planner to reinforcement leaning in the executive, thereby resulting a local feedback between the two of them.
Both of these points will be depicted later in Fig. 4 . In the mean time, the feedback channel, linking the executive to the perceptor, also features in Fig. 4 , which is discussed next. 
V. FEEDBACK CHANNEL
The feedback channel occupies a distinctive place within the CDS in that it has the perceptor on its right-hand side and the executive on its left-hand side; hence, it sits in the middle of the CDS. Most importantly, the feedback channel is fully occupied by internal rewards, whose primary function not only involves the perceptor on the right but also the executive on the left, as depicted in Fig. 3 . From this figure, we readily see that the entropic state of the perceptor is the input. As for outputs, there are two of them, one being reinforcement learning in the executive and the other being task-switch control, both of which will be discussed separately later.
A. UNDERLYING MATHEMATICS OF INTERNAL REWARDS
As mentioned previously, the internal rewards look to the entropic state of the perceptor for inputs. To this end, the incremental deviation in the internal rewards is defined as follows:
where H k−1 and H k are the entropic states computed at the cycles k − 1 and k, of the PAC, respectively. The internal reward, denoted by the symbol r k , is now formally defined as an arbitrary function of two entities, namely the entropic state H k and the incremental deviation 1 H k as shown by [11] ,
where g k (·) is an arbitrary single-valued operator. For example, the internal reward in eq. (7) may take on the simplified form:
To elaborate further, the 1 H k defined in eq. (6), may be viewed as a very short-term memory in that it has to store the past H k−1 and the current H k at the same time.
B. PROPERTIES OF INTERNAL REWARDS
Recognizing that the environmental condition is subject to variations from being free of uncertainties at some point in time to the presence of uncertainties at some other point in time, there are two entirely different properties of the internal rewards, introduced as follows:
(i) The internal rewards are always positive under the assumption that the physical system is uncertainty-free; moreover, the internal rewards are probabilistic in their characterization. (ii) The internal rewards are always negative under the assumption that the physical system is under the presence of uncertainties; moreover, they are no longer probabilistic. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the internal rewards will never assume the value zero, simply because no matter how perfect the perceptor is, it will always have some form of imperfections in its design.
In light of what we have just described, the internal rewards play their respective critical roles for dealing with reinforcement learning in the executive, or at the same time they get involved in the design of task-switch control, irrespective of what the environmental conditions are in reality.
VI. EXECUTIVE: VERSION I IS FREE OF UNCERTAINTY
Computationally speaking, the executive as a whole is the dominant part of the CDS. There are two different versions of the executive to be considered:
(i) Version I deals with environmental conditions that are uncertainty-free; (ii) Version II deals with a more demanding scenario, where the environmental conditions are subject to the presence of uncertainties. In this section, we focus on Version I of the executive, depicted in Fig. 4 . To be specific, the executive consists of two parts: reinforcement learning and cognitive control. The objective of reinforcement learning is to transform the incoming internal rewards computed in the feedback channel into an output called the value-to-go function; this function constitutes the input of the cognitive controller to be considered later.
A. REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
With the input of reinforcement learning consisting of internal rewards and the resulting value-to-go function being the desired output, we introduce the following terminology:
(i) Action space, denoted by C, contains all the hypothesized actions due to the probabilistic nature of internal rewards. (ii) Internal reward, denoted by r k , where k denotes the current PAC and the index k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n.
(iii) Discount factor, denoted by γ , which exponentially discounts the weight of future rewards. (iv) Policy, which is denoted by π k (c, c ), where c is the action at the k th PAC and c is the action taken at the immediate preceding PAC; accordingly, we can say that the policy is the probability of action c given the immediate past action c . Recognizing that the internal rewards are probabilistic, the function of reinforcement learning is therefore defined in probabilistic terms, for which we introduce the following terminology [11] :
(i) Value-to-go function, denoted by J (c), is the expected return, which is defined as the cumulative discounted internal rewards; mathematically, we write:
(ii) The expectation operator is denoted by E.
(iii) The superscript π is simplified version of the policy π k c, c , where c is the action at k th PAC and c is the immediate past action.
From a computational viewpoint to be consistent with the CDS, it is instructive to reformulate the value-to-go function, J (c), so that it can be updated algorithmically from one PAC to the next. With this point in mind, eq. (9) is reformulated as follows [11] , [12] :
where the left-pointing arrow indicates the updating of the algorithmic recursion from one PAC to the next. To this end, we have also introduced α > 0 as the learning-rate parameter; the expected immediate reward at the (k + 1) th PAC is therefore defined as follows:
Examining the above-mentioned eqs. (10) and (11), we may now summarize two important properties of the reinforcement learning algorithm as follows:
The algorithm follows a linear law of computational complexity with respect to the number of actions that are taken in eq. (10) .
Property 2 (Statelessness):
This second property of the algorithm follows from the fact that its input consists of internal rewards that are dimensionless. The resulting algorithm is therefore a special case of Bellman's dynamic programming [13] , [14] ; for a proof of this special case, see [11] . Henceforth, we therefore speak of the stateless RL algorithm.
The stage is now set for the second part of the executive, that is, cognitive control discussed next.
B. COGNITIVE CONTROL
Simply stated, cognitive control distinguishes itself from the rest of the CDS in Fig. 4 in the following sense: it builds on every other component of the CDS for a goal-directed action on the physical system. To this end, there are two basic components involved in cognitive control, introduced as follows:
(i) Planner, the function of which is to extract a set of prospective actions from the action-space, which are continually improved under the influence of attention from one shunt to the next [2] , [11] . (ii) Policy, the function which leads to decision-making based on the choice of the optimal cognitive action derived from the set of prospective actions computed by the planner. From a neuroscience perspective, it is noteworthy that both planning and decision-making are fundamental cognitive functions of the human prefrontal cortex [2] . Equally so, the expression ''cognitive control'' for a prefrontal function was first used by Miller and Cohen [15] , referring to the cortical mechanisms of top-down attention, which are consistent with our own views on the perceptor; however, in the context of this paper, they did not refer to the prospective functions of planner, policy, and predictive adaptation. In what follows, planner and policy will be discussed at some length below; predictive adaptation will be discussed later in Section IX.
1) PLANNER
To expand on functioning the planner that plays a key role in cognitive control, attention as well as the shunt are introduced under the following three points:
(i) The CDS is enriched significantly on account of both top-down attention in the perceptor and bottom-up attention in the executive; hence, relevant information in both the perceptor and the executive is enhanced, while at the same time irrelevant information is diminished from one PAC to the next. (ii) As it is in the human brain, several shunt cycles get involved in both the perceptor and the executive and therefore account for prospective actions within each PAC. (iii) Under the bottom-up attention from the planner to the reinforcement learning algorithm, role of predictor under the planner is improved from one PAC to the next. To expand further, the planner may use a relatively simple but effective greedy-strategy. For example, 5% of the time taken by a single PAC is devoted to exploration of the actionspace. On the other hand, an action is selected at random, 95% of the time, it is allocated for exploitation of the actionspace. However, in this situation, ''pure'' exploitation may be trapped in a local minimum. To mitigate this behavior, we adopt the notion of exploration and exploitation combined; hence a trade-off results between the two of them with a better resultant cognitive control. This trade-off is the set of prospective actions selected from the action-space of the planner by following a sequential procedure of interleaved value-to-go functions [11] , followed by several planning updates from one shunt to the next until a point is reached where the PAC is essentially completed. Furthermore, selection of the prospective actions is almost completely aligned with the value-to-go function, hence the term ''greedy'' [16] .
One last comment is in order: for a more refined functional exposition on how to design exploration and exploitation that involve human decision-making, the reader is referred to [17] .
2) EXCITATION AND INHIBITION IN THE EXECUTIVE
Here again, referring to the executive in Fig. 4 , we see a local feedback loop embodying the value-to-go function and the bottom-up attention. In a manner similar to the excitation and inhibition that were considered in the perceptor, we have two other representations:
(i) The planner picks up relevant information from the RL.
(ii) In a corresponding way, irrelevant information is put aside by the RL due to the planner. These two functional blocks work together in a reciprocal manner with the primary objective enabling cognitive control to improve its power for action on the physical system in the absence of uncertainty.
3) POLICY
Next, continuing with the function of the policy, we look to the prospective actions selected by the plan-ner on the one hand and working memory on the other, as depicted in Fig. 4 . The working memory consists of a limited set of past actions that is updated from one PAC to the next. The immediate past action or, alternatively, the average of the past actions in working memory is set against the prospective actions put forward by the planner, recognizing that all of these actions are probabilistic. To be specific, we may again use the MAP rule discussed preciously for deriving the optimal cognitive action for cognitive control. Let the vector y denote the set of prospective actions and let the vector z denote the corresponding cognitive action. We may then use eq. (2) for the Bayesian generative model of the perceptor to define the following equation for the problem at hand:
where l (z) is the likelihood function and p (z) is the prior. Accordingly, we now make the following statement:
The posterior, p (z | y), represents the cognitive action performed on the physical system, which is defined as the likelihood function, l (z) , that is predictive by one PAC ahead, multiplied by the prior, p (z), that is the past posterior. Hence, cognitive action performed on the physical system by cognitive control in the executive is completed, setting the stage of the second version of the executive.
VII. EXECUTIVE: VERSION II IS UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Version II is much more demanding than version I in both understanding as well as computation. The reason for this difference is because version II is subject to uncertainties, whereas Version I is not. Under Version I we speak straightforwardly of cognitive control, but now the presence of uncertainties imposes the necessity for dealing with risk. With environmental uncertainties being an issue for the CDS to tackle mathematically and computationally, it is instructive that we begin the discussion by addressing the issues of uncertainty and risk that are discussed next.
A. UNCERTAINTY AND RISK
In today's world, the environment is unavoidably prone to the unexpected occurrence of unpredicted events. For example, we are frequently confronted with physical cyber-security in one form or another, as discussed in the special issue [18] , for which cognitive risk control plays a very important role. To address such an important example and many others like it, we must begin the discussion with two related definitions:
(i) Uncertainty is a situation that involves information pertaining to a physical system, for which the information is unknown and therefore difficult to deal with. (ii) Whenever a physical system experiences uncertainty, it is a must that cognitive control expands its functionality in order to deal with unexpected adverse events, which are collectively called risk; hence, we bring into play cognitive risk control as the solution for tackling uncertainties.
With these two points in mind and considering a physical system within the CDS, the presence of uncertainty and therefore risk affecting the system may ordinarily be inevitable in one form or another. However, under cognitive risk control, rooted in predictive adaptation that embodies executive memory, it turns out in what follows that the physical system bypasses the presence of uncertainty as if it did not exist! As an illustrative example of how the issue of risk can occur: consider an autonomous vehicle moving within its own lane in a crowded city street. Suppose also a nearby cyclist suddenly rushes out of his/her lane and tries to move to the other side of the street in front of the autonomous vehicle. This scenario may create a sudden and dramatic risk to both of them: hence, the need for bringing risk under control in that situation, and many others like it.
B. EXECUTIVE MEMORY
From a practical perspective, we begin the discussion on cognitive risk control by considering the executive memory, depicted in Fig. 5 . In a distinctive way, the executive memory in cognitive risk control is the dual of the working memory in cognitive control. To expand on this duality, it is necessary that we highlight the contextual differences between executive memory and working memory, as follows: the actionspace of the executive memory has a large time-frame and more options, whereas the action-space of the working memory is limited to the ''here and now''; we may therefore say that the executive memory informs the working memory, and what separates them from each other is simply a temporal parameter.
FIGURE 5.
Executive memory with two inputs: past experience from policy, and past experience from classifier; prospective past experiences of executive memory as output.
As depicted in Fig. 5 , the executive memory embodies two inputs and a single output. The two inputs, involving past experiences, are defined as follows:
(i) When cognitive control is uncertainty-free, the executive memory picks up past experiences from the cognitive action that results from cognitive control. (ii) When there is uncertainty, the cognitive action takes on a perturbed form, and directed-goal action takes on the form of risk-sensitive cognitive action; this time around, the executive memory picks up past experiences from this new way of thinking. The important point to note here is the fact that under both of these two points, all the past experiences stored in the action library of the executive memory are free from uncertainties. It is also noteworthy that the executive memory and the working memory are both dynamic in their respective ways; it is therefore expected that both of them learn from their respective past experiences as they do occur. 
C. TWO DIFFERENT MODES OF COGNITIVE RISK CONTROL
From what we have just described, there are two modes to be considered for cognitive risk control in an orderly manner, one mode dealing with no uncertainty and the other mode dealing with it.
1) MODE I: COGNITIVE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF UNCERTAINTY
Referring to Fig. 6a , cognitive action originates from the policy in the same way as that depicted in Fig. 4 , with cognitive control embodying a local feedback loop of adaptation that involves the working memory. In this mode, cognitive action is performed directly on the physical system by means of the policy for decision-making, empowered with prospective actions presented by the planner. However, Fig. 6a is radically different from Fig. 4 in two ways: the executive memory is passive because it does not have a feedback loop of its own, but it does have a link that connects it all the way to the cognitive action that is the same as that in Fig. 4 ; most importantly through this link, the executive memory picks up past experiences for storage to be used in the future. To distinguish itself from cognitive control, the executive memory has the color green in Fig. 6a .
2) MODE II: RISK-SENSITIVE COGNITIVE ACTION UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Distinctly different from the first mode, a more elaborate way of thinking must be put into play under the second mode, which involves the need for a new term: classifier that is responsible for decision-making and therefore action on the physical system, as depicted in Fig. 6b below Fig. 6a . Under the presence of uncertainty, we now have a perturbed cognitive action on the left-hand side of the classifier. In a corresponding way, the executive memory selects a set of past experiences for the right-hand side of the classifier; hence, the stage is set for the risk-sensitive cognitive action on the physical system. As for past-experiences library of the executive memory, there are two sources for it: first, when the executive memory is passive in the absence of uncertainty as in mode I; second, when the executive memory is active in the presence of uncertainty as in Mode II. In reality, this latter source of past experiences is attributed to the local feedback loop that is part and parcel of the executive memory.
In the case of Mode I, the passive executive memory is covered in the color green to distinguish itself from cognitive control as shown in Fig. 6a ; the color green applies equally well to the risk-sensitive cognitive action, as shown in Fig. 6b .
D. SUB-SECTION AT THE BOTTOM OF THE EXECUTIVE WITH SWITCHES IN MIND
At this point in the discussion, it is instructive that Figs. 6a and 6b are integrated together in the sub-section at the bottom part of the executive; correspondingly, we also bring into play cognitive risk control under Modes I and II. In so doing, there will naturally be two different configurations, one of which involves the absence of uncertainty and the other one involves the presence of uncertainty.
However, for the purpose of brevity, we have opted for Mode II, for which the executive memory is not only active, but it is also under the presence of uncertainty. The direct consequence of being under uncertainty is the fact that the entire CDS operates under a perturbed condition, except for the executive memory and its belongings. In light of the resulting perturbation, examination of Figs. 6a and 6b leads us to bring switches into the sub-section of the executive memory, as depicted in Fig. 7 in an overall sense: (i) For Fig. 6a , there are two switches, labeled S1 and S2. The switch S1 is opened and therefore we now have perturbed cognitive action; the switch S2 is also opened for preventing the perturbed cognitive action from affecting the executive memory. (ii) For Fig. 6b , there is another pair of switches, labeled S3 and S4. The switch S3 is used for the perturbed cognitive action to be linked from the policy to the classifier on the left-hand side; the switch S4 is required for the feedback loop of the executive memory to be closed on other side of the classifier.
As for Mode I, it is a straightforward matter for experience derived from how Mode II operates: simply put, reverse the operations of the four switches in Fig. 7 .
E. DECISION-MAKING
To begin with decision-making, we must recognize the fact that the perturbed cognitive control on the left-hand side of the classifier in Fig. 7 is of probabilistic origin. Furthermore, VOLUME 5, 2017 the prospective past experiences generated by the executive memory on the opposite side of the classifier are also probabilistic on account of the fact that each past experience is selected from the action-space of the executive memory in a random manner.
Invoking the Bayesian paradigm under the presence of classifier in Fig. 7 , the stage is set for dealing with cognitive risk control. To this end, given a randomly selected set of past experiences denoted by x 1 , x 2 , . . . c, x N and a corresponding perturbed posterior denoted by y, the past experience that is the closest to y so defined by the Bayes rule is as follows:
As previously mentioned, the denominator term in this equation is merely a scaling factor, and since it does not involve itself in maximization of the cognitive action, we may ignore it. We may therefore formulate the Bayes rule for defining the past experience that is the closest to the perturbed action y as follows:
where the probability of the past experience, p x j , is the prior. Assuming that all the past experiences selected from the executive memory are equally likely, we may therefore set p x j = 1 N and with it being a scalar, we may go one step further and ignore the prior altogether. Thus, eq. (14) is finally simplified as follows:
To sum up, we may make the following two-fold statement: (i) Given the set of N past experiences selected from the executive memory, the perturbed cognitive action y is assigned to that particular posterior that has the largest value among all the p y|x j for j = 1, 2, . . . , N . (ii) The particular posterior so chosen defines the risksensitive cognitive action as the goal-directed action on the physical system. Having discussed the topic of decision-making, we move on to the related issue of task-switch control, considered next.
VIII. TASK-SWITCH CONTROL
Under Modes I and II discussed in the previous section, therein we formulated two pairs of switches, labeled (S1, S2) and (S3, S4); they were the results of addressing two completely different environmental conditions, one involving the absence of uncertainties and the other one involving their presence, respectively. To move on, we need a new function that has the capability to exploit those two pairs of switches: the desired goal is to identify the presence of uncertainties and therefore bring risk under control given the observables. The function that is needed for this challenge is called the task-switch control. In the past, we have tried several different procedures for finding the desired function: the conclusion has been to focus on internal rewards in the feedback channel as the basis for defining the procedure for task-switch control.
Referring back to the feedback channel in Section V, we recall that the internal rewards can only assume positive or negative values, with zero not being permitted: it is these two entirely different properties of internal rewards that hold the keys for defining the task-switch control.
A. FEEDBACK CHANNEL WITH TWO DIFFERENT STATES
With cognitive control being the component of the executive that is directly influenced by internal rewards, be they positive or negative, there are two different states of the feedback channel, as follows:
1) STATE I: INTERNAL REWARDS ARE POSITIVE
Under this first state, cognitive control operates in the absence of uncertainties, for which the internal rewards are positive. Furthermore, recalling from the opposite version of Fig. 7 , the first closed pair of switches is (S1, S2). To be more precise, switch S1 is responsible for cognitive action on the physical system; the other switch S2 is responsible for past experiences acquired by the passive executive memory that originate from the cognitive action when there are no uncertainties. Hence, with switches (S1, S2) closed, the other pair of switches, (S3, S4) involving the executive memory must be opened.
2) STATE II: INTERNAL REWARDS ARE NEGATIVE
Under this second state, cognitive control is in the presence of uncertainties, for which the internal rewards are therefore negative. This time around, however, we look to Fig. 7 , for which switch S4 is closed with the executive memory being active; in this figure, the switch S4 links the policy under perturbed cognitive action to the left-hand side of the classifier with respect to the set of prospective actions of past experiences of the executive memory on its right hand-side. Furthermore, to complete the risk-sensitive cognitive action on the physical system, the executive memory must bring into play the closed switch S3 that is responsible for its own local adaptive loop. With the pair of switches, (S3, S4), being closed, the other pair of switches, (S1, S2), must be opened.
Continuing this discussion, there are two corresponding lessons to be learned from States I and II; they are respectively described as follows:
(i) If internal rewards of the feedback channel are positive, then the pair of switches, (S1, S2), must be closed, which therefore means that the other pair of switches, (S3, S4), must be opened; hence, in this first case, the decision will be made in favor of the uncertainties being absent. (ii) On the other hand, if the internal rewards are negative, then the pair of switches, (S3, S4), must be closed, which therefore means that the other pair of switches, (S1, S2), must be opened. Hence, in this second case, the decision is made in favor of uncertainties that are present due to the executive memory, colored green in Fig. 7 ; it is here that risk-sensitive cognitive action is made specifically for the physical system.
With points (i) and (ii) just made, the stage is set for an important issue considered next. 
B. NETWORK OF SWITCHES
We begin the second part of this section, recognizing that the task-switch control, positioned in the middle of the CDS with the perceptor on its right and the executive on its left, is indeed at the heart of the CDS. With this profound statement in mind, Fig. 8 presents a block diagram of the task-switch control, the two outputs of which are defined as follows, in light of Fig. 8 : (i) When internal rewards of the feedback channel are positive, left-hand output of task-switch control is defined by the two pairs of switches: (S1, S2) is closed, and (S3, S4) is opened. (ii) On the other hand, when the internal rewards are negative, right-hand output of task-switch control is defined by two pairs of switches: (S1, S2) is opened, and (S3, S4), is closed this time around. Finally, we do indeed have a network of switches, labeled (S1, S2) and (S3, S4), as depicted in Fig. 8 . Hence, we say that it is cognitive control that is responsible for the underlying load of the task-switch control in dealing with the network of switches.
IX. PREDICTIVE ADAPTATION
The next important idea to be discussed, predictive adaptation, proceeds in two logical parts that are addressed as follows [19] :
(i) Prediction, the function of which is for cognitive risk control to be consistently ahead of the observables under uncertainty by one PAC from one cycle to the next; this way of functioning is accounted for by the planner that was discussed under cognitive control in Section VI, and applies equally well to cognitive risk control.
(ii) Adaptation, the function of which is to bypass the presence of uncertainty through two different functions: first, the working memory in local feedback loop that embodies the policy for cognitive control; second, the executive memory embedded in local feedback loop of its own for cognitive risk control that is goal-directed for the physical system. Although points (i) and (ii) are integrated as a single statement, they are actually physically separated from each other. At this point in the discussion pertaining to points (i) and (ii), it is instructive that we take a breather and refer to the following statement that is taken from the viewpoint of cognitive neuroscience, as previously mentioned under the Introduction:
The prefrontal cortex makes the brain a pre-adaptive system. Going on further, in a rather loose sense viewed from the engineering perspective, a large part of the executive may be viewed as the counterpart of the prefrontal cortex in the brain; with this point in mind, the following new term is introduced:
Large part of the executive consists of cognitive control, network of switches, classifier, and executive memory; henceforth, we introduce the new term called the ''prefrontal executive''. We are therefore emboldened to make the following statement [1] :
The prefrontal executive makes the CDS a predictiveadaptive system. Furthermore, insofar as this statement is concerned, we expand it one more step as follows:
For the predictive-adaptive system to be a reality, taskswitch control must play a key role within the CDS. The predictive-adaptive system may assume one of two forms, depending on whether uncertainties exist in the physical system or absent otherwise. Referring back to the role of task-switch control, it defines cognitive action under the first form when switches (S1, S2) and (S3, S4) are closed and opened, respectively. For risk-sensitive cognitive action for the second form, the opposite one is defined.
X. ARCHITECTURAL STRUCTURE OF THE CDS IN RISK CONTROL
We begin the discussion on the architectural structure of the CDS described under Fig. 9 , for which the following important statement pertaining to the CDS, is quoted from an unknown reviewer:
''Better part of the paper describes in much detail the architecture and implementation details of the risksensitive cognitive model, with the key result outlined in Figure 9 . The key strength of the manuscript is exactly this well-described and novel CDS architecture.'' To reinforce the unknown reviewer's statement, we need only say that the net result of the entire CDS is the realization of risk-sensitive cognitive action on the physical system in the presence of uncertainties. VOLUME 5, 2017 FIGURE 9. Architectural composition of the CDS with four different colors: orange for the perceptor; blue for the entire executive; green for the executive memory and classifier for the risk-sensitive cognitive action; purple for the feedback channel and the task-switch controller; red line for the shunt cycle; and finally the dashed contour for the switch network.
In a corresponding way, we also see that the PAC in Fig. 9 is more complex than that of the PAC in Fig. 4 , which makes the former more powerful in the context of information processing. This differentiation shows up more simply in the graphical format depicted in Fig. 10 , where we have brought in two entities of nodes and edges (links). Examination of the two insets in Fig. 10 , it broadens our knowledge of cognitive risk control, immensely as follows:
(i) In Fig. 10a , we have regular PAC that follows the ordinary global cycle depicted in Fig. 1 , representing cognitive control in the absence of uncertainties. (ii) In direct contrast with respect to Fig. 10b , we have a complex PAC that is much more informative in the presence of uncertainties for two reasons: first, the classifier is affected externally from the perceptor and internally from the executive memory; second, the risksensitive cognitive action on the physical system is actually computed by the classifier. We thus see that past experiences selected by the executive memory are indeed responsible for this action. Hence, the physical system senses the environment as if uncertainties do not exist! Simply put, the architectural structure of the CDS presented in Fig. 9 is unique in the world of engineering as we know it today.
XI. PARALLELS OF THE CDS WITH THE HUMAN BRAIN
Along the way, starting from the introduction in Section I to structural composition of the CDS in Section VIII, we have on several occasions brought into the discussion elements of the CDS looking to the human brain for inspiration. In this section, we plan to do the opposite to learn more from the human brain. To begin, the PAC viewed in the context of the brain is the fundamental dynamic principle of the cognitive (and emotional) adaptation of the organism to its environment. Its anatomical substrate consists of two tiers of nervous structures hierarchically organized along the nerve axis, from the spinal cord up to the cerebral cortex: a posterior tier for sensation and perception, and an anterior tier for executive action. The two tiers are reciprocally interlinked by bidirectional connections at all levels. That reciprocal interlinking of the perceptual and executive hierarchies at the level of the cerebral cortex constitutes the connective infrastructure of the cognitive PAC of the brain, which is simulated by the PAC of the CDS as we have discussed it.
At the summit of the human PAC is the posterior association cortex, in charge of perception and perceptual memory. Also at that summit, in the anterior part of the brain, is the frontal association cortex, the prefrontal cortex, in charge of executive action and executive memory: the highest level of that executive cortex is the prefrontal cortex of the PAC. That prefrontal control of the PAC is essentially the structural and functional support of the functions we postulate and computationally formulate in the CDS.
With evolution (phylogeny) and with individual development (ontogeny) the prefrontal cortex grows more, yet it does it later, than any other brain region. It grows not only in size but also in internal and external connectivity (with other brain structures). Because it is the last to develop among other brain structures, the prefrontal cortex has been called the ''vanguard'' of evolution-we might add also of ontogeny, for it does not reach full maturity until the third decade of life. Undoubtedly, this late maturation accounts for more plasticity and individual variance in the adult than any other part of the cortex.
If there is one functional feature that makes the prefrontal cortex exquisitely human, it is its dynamic projection into the future, for which reason it has been said that the prefrontal cortex opens the organism to its future. It serves us to imagine and to create our future; hence, the undisputable role of the prefrontal cortex in planning, one of its most distinctive ''cognitive-control'' properties, as it is of the CDS. In fact, all of its cognitive functions are almost by definition temporally prospective, they look ahead in time: planning, executive attention, working memory, and decision-making. We have incorporated all of it into our CDS. And so we have done of risk control, a variant of cognitive control that shares with it all those functions.
For the nervous system, estimated risk, like estimated benefits (''rewards''), is a prospective neuro-economic variable, and as such very much a part of the role of the prefrontal cortex in the preadaptation property of the PAC. But, all executive actions of the prefrontal cortex are based on ''history.'' That is the reason why those functions depend so strictly on the reciprocal connections between the prefrontal cortex and the posterior (''perceptor'') cortex. That history, however, is the product of past experience, and may not exactly apply to the present or future cycles of the PAC. The reason is because the past, and even more so the future, may be full of complexities, ambiguities, and, as we say, ''uncertainty.'' This is when we have to introduce Bayesian (i.e., probabilistic) logic between the perceptor and the executive. Hypotheses from past experience may thus be updated to the present and, for the sake of risk control, become probabilistic estimators (and pre-adaptors). Hence, it can be justifiably said that the Bayesian filter is a distinct and unique feature of our model.
XII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
This section of the paper is divided into two parts. The first part enumerates the conclusions drawn from our study. The second part addresses briefly the issue of reasoning from engineering back to the brain, and the next issue addresses how hierarchical learning in the CDS simulates the brain.
A. CONCLUSIONS 1. Although in neuroscience there are several ways in which cognition is defined, the choice made for the CDS was first described in a classic book, entitled Cortex and Mind: Unifying Cognition [20] ; in that book, five principles were identified for the definition of cognition: the perception-action cycle, memory, attention, intelligence, and language; in this paper, language has been put aside for another day. 2. The classic Bayesian paradigm first described in [21] , occupies a distinctive place in the perceptor of the CDS as well as a good part of cognitive risk control in the executive. 3. The celebrated linear Kalman filter [6] and its more powerful third-order nonlinear expansion, namely the Cubature Kalman filter, are perfect research tools for estimating the state of the physical system. 4. Shannon's information theory has brought into play computation of the entropic state of the perceptor for the first time in the CDS [9] . 5. Internal rewards are responsible for the task-switch control positioned at the heart of the CDS that has been described in the paper for the first time; the realization of which has taken more than six years. 6. Bellman's dynamic programming [14] in mathematics is the perfect tool for viewing reinforcement learning in the executive as the dual of Bayesian generative model in the perceptor. 7. Predictive adaptation in the executive, performed around the executive memory, brings risk-sensitive cognitive action on the physical system under control under the presence of uncertainties [1] , [19] , which is truly remarkable. 8. In light of the mathematical and computational fundamentals discussed in different parts of the paper, the CDS is stable and optimal for practical applications.
B. FUTURE WORKS
1. Reasoning from engineering back to the brain, it is plausible to infer that the biological CDS of the brain should have the following attributes in addition to those that inspired much of the present study: (a) reinforcement learning guided by internal rewards, (b) Bayesian perception and decision-making, and (c) predictive risk control. 2. In its current form, the CDS is a single-layered structure.
For it to become more powerful, the Bayesian generative model in the perceptor would have to assume an upward hierarchical divergent component; and by the same token, the stateless RL would have to also assume a downward hierarchical convergent component; moreover, the new CDS would have to be reciprocally coupled horizontally on a layer-by-layer basis.
Finally, it is important to note that work is currently in progress in Haykin's research laboratory to address cognitive risk control for a physical system with a practical application in mind. To be specific, the application is that of selfdriving cars, based on the cognitive dynamic system depicted in Fig. 9 . This application will be the first of its kind with adverse events due to the presence of uncertainties, for which risk-sensitive cognitive actions are carried out and risk is brought under control for the physical system.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Coauthors of the paper thank Dr. Medhi Fatemi for comments that were made for reinforcement learning.
JOAQUíN M. FUSTER has devoted his research career to the cognitive neuroscience of the cerebral cortex. His principal contributions have been to the physiology of the frontal lobe in cognition.
He was the first to discover memory cells in the prefrontal cortex and later in the temporal and parietal cortices. These cells and their connections form cortical networks that, when activated, constitute the functional substrate of working memory, an executive function essential for goal-directed behavior, language, and reasoning. Studies of those networks in the welldefined experimental conditions of working memory are making it possible to characterize the organization of long-term memory and its dynamics in the perception/action cycle. These studies substantiate the new network paradigm of cortical memory that Dr. Fuster has proposed (the Cognit). 
